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I

In the Supre01e Court of the
State of Utah

RO~BERT

K. DUSENBERRY and
EDITH C. DUSENBERRY, hls wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

CASE
NO. 8712

TAYLOR'S, a corporation,
Defendant .and Respondenrt.

Brief of Defendant and Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent -cannot accept ··the Statement of Facts set
out in Appellants' Brief as a complete or proper statement.
It is ·confined largely to 1Jhat testimony which supports
appellants' theocy, disregarding the great weight of the
evidence as found by the lower ~court. Appellants' Brief
dramatically omits all of the testimony and evidence concerning rthe intention of the original contract parties, the
general practice of defendant in sales of his kind, and tJhe
actual practice used by defendant in this particUlar sale.
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This action was brought by plaintiffs praying for a
Declaratory Judgment to determine the true owner of the
carpets and drapes lin question (Prayer of Plaintffis' Complaint). · Defendant prayed for the same relief -in its Answer (Prayer of defendant's Answer). The only relief requested by either ·party was pertaining to the title of the
carpets and draJP€S (Complaint and Answer) . There is· no
evidence or issue tbefore this Court or the lower court that
the m~han<tise in issue is a fixture in any way, manner,
or form, many building. The term "wall-to-wall carpeting"
is used for .the first time in Appellants' Brief.
Prior to August 31, 1954, Mrs. G. L. Miller purchased
various items o.f merehandise from defendant upon an open
account. . Mrs. Miller periodically requested defendant to
··hold: merohandise until she had finally deternrlned she
wanted ·to purchase said merohandise (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
No~ 1) ~- Mrs. MiNer selected various items of furniture, including· ·carpets, linoleum and drupes, all of which were in;·voiced as started on Plaintiffs' Emibit No. 9 and page 2 of
··Defendant's. Exhibit 8. That sometime after rthat a down
payment of $300.00 was made on merchandise selected by
MrS. Miller (Tr. 51). That during the selection of the mer··ohandise by Mrs. Miller, she told defendant's salesman, Mr.
Steadman, that ·she intended to purchase and finance the
·merchandise she was selecting ·upon defendant's contract
·(Tr. 20). Defendant has only one contract form and that
·this form ·contains a title retaining provision in it. On or
about July 10, 1954, Mr. G. L. Miller· was interviewed for
credit by "P.M.", on of defendant's employees (Defendant's
Exhi:bit No. 7). On August 31, 1954, the carpets in question, together with linoleum and other items, \vere posted
upon defendanrt's Aecounts Receivable Ledger (~laintiffs'
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Exhibit No. 1) for :purposes of a bookkeeping entry (Tr.
39). Thart the 'cash payment of $300.00 made by Mrs. Miller to defendant was transferred fvom rt:he hoJd sheets to
the Accounts Receivable Ledger ·oo August 31, 1954 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1). On Septe,mber 9, 1954, Mrs. Miller
executed defendant's ·contract, and defendant posted the
carpets in question, together with other items, to defendant's Notes Receivable Ledger (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1,
page 2). '!bart on rthe same day, September 9, 1954, Mrs.
Miller purchased drapes from defendant (Page 2, Plaintiffs' Exhtbit No. 1) and executed a Conditional Sales Contract (Plaintiffs' EX!hi:bit No. 2) which specifically retained

title.
Subsequent ·to the making of the invoice and the execution of the ·Conditional Sales Contract by Mrs. Miller
Plaintiffs' EXJhibit No. 2) (Tr. 35), and prior to September
30, 1954, the 'Carpeting and dvapes in issue herein were delivered and installed by defendant in the home of Mrs. Miller Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1). That on September 30, 1954,
the final determination was made of the purchase price of
said carpeting and drapes, and Mrs. Miller was given credit
upon her Alccount Receivable Ledger (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
No. 1) ~or the .carpet pad not used in the Miller house and
labor not used (Tr. 24).
It was the custom and practice of defendant to post
selected merchandise to its Accounts Receivable Ledger
of its customers as a bookkeeping entry for the purposes
of its records until the customer executed the intended contract (Tr. 43); that the invo~ce of said merchandise was
either marked "charge" or ",Contract" (Tr. 32) after delivery of the merohadise to the customer (Tr. 43). That
in the case of carpeting and floor eovering and drapes, the
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final purchase price was not determined until after the
merchandise was installed whenever defendant was to make
the insrtallartion, and the amount of material used, plus the
labor eharge, was finally determined and then charged (Tr.
24).
1

The plaintiffs purchased a home situated in Orem,
Utah, from the conditional vendee, Mrs. Mill&; that at the

time of the pUI"ohase of the home, plaintiffs WeTe not aware
of rtJhe outSJtanding eontract between defendant and Mrs.
Miller, and had no actual knowledge until September, 1956;
that at tJhe time of the pUI"ohase orf the home by plaintiffs
from Mrs. Miller, Mrs. Miller attempted to sell the carpets
and drapes in issue to plaintiffs; rthat plaintiffs made no inquiry concerning the alleged title af the subject property
in Mrs. Miller, otheT than the fact that Mrs. Miller had possession of said property (Tr. 4) .
Defendant had made numerous demands for paYJ.nent
upon Mrs. Miller, and received many promises that were
ot kept by Mrs. Miller (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) (Tr. 44).
Defendant was not aware of the sale of 1Jhe Miller house
by Mrs. MilleT to plainrtiff until the summer of 1956 ('l'r.
44). Plaintiffs 'did not obtain a Bill of Sale of any kind
from Mrs. Miller to indicate ownership of the said personal
property. The only written evidence before the Court is a
letter purportedly written by Mrs. Miller (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5) during the negotiations of the sale o[ the house
to plaintiffs. ':Dhe final ·contract between plaintiffs and Mrs.
Miller does not indicate a transfer of title of carpets or
drapes to plaintiffs. Neither ·the deed (Plaintiffs' Ex·hibirt
No. 3) nor the mortgage (Plaintiff's E)Chibit No. 4) show
any evidence of ·title in the plaintiffs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND
HOLDING THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING WAS
STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT. THE COURT DID
NOT RULE UPON THE TITLE '110 THE TILE AND LINOLEUM.
POINT II
THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT IS VALID
AND ENFO·RCEABLE. IT MEETS ALL STATUTORY
REQUffiEMENTS AS 'DO ITS ENFORCEABILITY.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF1S ARE N'OT PUR·CHASERS OF RE.A!.LTY WITH FIXTURES A'ITACHED. PLAINTIFFS HAVE
NOT RECEIVED TITLE TO THE MERCHANDISE FROM
ANY SOURCE.
POINT IV
RUSS.ELL VS. HARKNESS IS AUTHORITY O·N
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.
THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID· NOT ERR IN FINDING AND
HOLDING THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING WAS
STILL VESTED IN DEFEND~NT. THE C!OURT D~ID
NOT RULE UPON THE TITLE TO THE TILE AND LINOLEUM.
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':Dhe facts as determined by the lower court clearly show
that Mrs. Miller, the conditional vendee of the carpets and
drapes art issue, selected rtJhe carpets, made a down payment
with a request to hold the merchandise; told the salesman
before and during the selection of the carpets and drapes
that she intended to purchase ·the merchandise upon a contract; that defendant had only one ty1pe of eontract, which
retained title in the seller until the merchandise was paid
fior; ·that Mr. Miller was interviewed for credit; that at the
time of making out the invoice for the carpeting the final
purohase price was not determined fior the reason that the
actual amount of carpeting and labor ~could not be determined until after it was installed ·and the labor performed
by defendant as agreed upon. That subsequent to the delivery of the ca~s a bookkeeping entry was made on defendant's Accounts Receivable Ledger, and the merchandise
transferred from a hold sheet of defendant. That subsequent to this bookkeeping entry upon defendant's Accounts
Receivable Ledger, Mrs. Miller executed the contract in evidence, and another bookkeeping entry was made by defendant ·to transfer the account to the ·contract ledger. That
the final purchase price on the carpets was not determined
until after the contract was signed by Mrs. Miller.
It was the intention of the conditional vendor and vendee that title to the subject personal property should remain in rthe defendant until after the said property was paid
for. Property in specific goods passes when the parties so
intend. (60-2-2, UCA 1953: E. C. Olsen Co. vs. Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d 324, 331).
':Dhis was a eontract to sen prior to the execution of the
Conditional Sales Contract, and the final detennination of
the purchase priee. "Dhe contract of sale was made at the
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time of the execution of the

Condi~tional

Sales Contract.

WheTe there is a contract to sen specifie goods, or where
goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the
seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriation,
reserve the right of possession or property in the goods until certain conditions have been fulfilled. The right of
possession or pPoperrty may be thus reserved notwithstanding the delivery od: tJhe goods to the buyer, or to a earrier
or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer. (G0-2-4 (1) UCA 1953.
rrh~

contract was not final until the purchase price was
ascertained, and this was not done until the subject property was installed in the house and the exact amount of
mateTial and labor determined to compute the final purchase pri~ce.
When terms for payment left for future determination,
the contract is incomplete. Hi-Way Motor Company vs.
Service Motors Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 P. 133.
The merchandise was not in a deliverable state at the
time plaintiffs allege title passed, for the parties agreed
that defendant was to perform the labor.
"Where there is a ·contract to sell specific goods,
and the seller is bound to do something to the goods
for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state,
the property does not pass until such thing is done."
60-2-3 (2) UCA 1953.
Defendant's posting upon its Accounts Receivable
Ledger of the ca.vpets was ~merely a bookkeeping entry for
the purpose o[ keeping a record o[ where the mevchandise
was after delivery by defendant to :the house of ·conditional
buyer. It was not the final agreement between defendant
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and eondition.al vendee. The defendant's method of bookkeeping is not important or determinative as to the nature
of rtJhe contract. Ford Motor Company vs. Nartional Bond
& Investment Co., Illinois, 14 NE 2d 306, 175 ALR 1372.
'1.1here is no written evidence presented by plaintiffs
upon which to base their claim otf title to the property in
question, the drapes and carpets. The letter to plaintiffs
from Mrs. Miller was apparently written during the negotiations for the sale of the house (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5) .
The final eontract, the deed and mortgage (Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 3 and 4) do not evidence any transfer of title
to the carpets or drapes to plaintiffs. There is no Bill of
Sale in evidence. Plaintiffs have nothing upon which to
base their alleged title.
The Statute of Frauds requires that a sale of merchandise valued in excess of $500.00 be in writing. 25-5-1 to 9,
UCA 1953. There is no such writing in evidence before
this Court. 'Dhe original cost of the carpets alone was $1,267.32, and ~they were only one year old when the purported sale was made by Mrs. Miller to plaintiffs. Defendant intended to and did comply with Statute of Frauds by
the execution of the Conditional Sales Oonrtract.
This was clearly a conditional sale and not a chattel
mortgage, as argued by plaintiffs. A Conditional Sales Contract as defined in 15-1-2a (c), UCA 1953, is as follows:
(1) (a) "Any contract for sale of tangible personal
property, with or without accessories, under which
possession is delivered to the buyer but the title vests
in the buyer 1hereafter only upon the payment of all
or part of the price, or upon ~the performance of any
other eondlition."
(1) ( C)
1

"Any contract for the sale of any tangible
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personal property, with or without accessories, under
wthioh the possession is delivered to the buyer, and a
lien upon the property is to vest in tJhe seller as S€CUTity for the payment of part or all of rthe price, or for
the performance of ~any other condition.''
The ·aJbove statute clearly defines the Conditional Sales
Contract in issue as a conditional sale. The title never
passed. Title was retained by defendant at all tiems. Title
has to pass before a ehatrtel mortgage may be obtained.
Freed Furniture and Carpet ·Co. vs. Sorensen, 28 .Urtah
419, 432, 79 P. 564, 568, defines a conditional sale as "a sale
in whtch the transfer of title to the thing sold, to the purchaser, or retention of it, is made to depend upon the performance of some condition."
This is not a situation where the 1nerchandise was so~d
for resale to a dealer who had apparent authority to sen
the me1~handise. Mrs. Miller had no apparent -authority
to sell other than possession of the merchandise itself. Possession alone is not sufficient to rely upon. Russell vs.
Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P. 865.
'f.he drapes were purchased the same date the Conditional Sales Contract was executed. There is no question
but what the title to the drapes remained with the defend-

ant.
In summary, this was a eonditiooal sale by defendant
to Mrs. Miller, and not a chattel mortgage. !Defendant retained title to the said property at all times and stages of
the negotiations between Mrs. Miller and defendant. There
\Vas no absolute sale until the Cb.ndiftional Sales ~Contract
was executed and 1Jhe final purchase price determined. Mrs.
Miller had no tirtle to eonvey to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have
no present evidence of title to ·the said personal iJ'roperty.
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POINT II
THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT IS VALID
AND ENF10RCEABLE. IT MEETS ALL STATUTORY
REQUIREME.NTS AS TO ITS ENFORCEABILITY.

The c·onditional Sales

~Contr.act

in issue herein is valid

and enforceable.
The contract was signed by the original buyer, Mrs.
G. L. Miller, the ~contm.cting party with defendant. Mrs.
G. L. Miller was not the contracting party, as alleged by
plaintiffs in their brief (Plaintiffs' EX1hibit 2).
15-1-2a (B-1) is a statute regulating the rate of interest to be ·charged on conditional sales contracts. The lower
court specifically determined that usury was not an issue in
this case (Tr. 112). 'Dhe evidence of defendant proved beyond doubt that there was no question of usury on the

Conditional Sales Contract (Tr. 43).
The eompliance of the provision of the above statute
which states that the parties to the contract should both
sign the contract is not mandatory. The second paragraph
of 15-1-2a (B-5) states as follows: "If the seller, except
as the result of an accidental or bona fide error in computation shall violate any other ·provision of this section, such
failure shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability
of the conditional sales contract.''
The only forfeiture provision of the said statute is in
the event seller intentionally violate the interest provisions
of the chapter. 15-1-2a (B-5). Errors in computation
made in good fiaith are e~sable. The statute itself specifically states that the failure of seller to sign the condi-

tional sales contract does not affect its validity or enforce-
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ability. Pl·aintiffs' contention to the contrary is entirely
without merit.
A statute is not mandatory unless a forfeiture provision in ~the statute makes the mission to perform fatal.
Clark Montana Realty Company vs. Butte, etc., Copper
Co., 233 Fed. 547, Affd. 249 U. S. 12
POINT III

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT PURCHASERS OF REAL·
TY WITH FIXTURES ATTACHED. PLAINTIFFS HAVE
NOT RECEIVED TITLE TO THE MERCHANDISE FROM
ANY SOURCE.

There is no evidence in the entire record that the car-peting in issue is wall to wall carpeting, or that the carpet:.
ing is or was attached to a building, temporarily or otherwise. The only and first place that wall to wall carpeting
is mentioned is in Appellants' Brief.
As pointed out in my Statement of Facts herein, there
is no issue before the Court pevtaining :tJO linoleum or tile
(See prayers orf Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendant's Answer. See Judgment).
There was no evidence taken by the lower court as to
whether or not the carpets or drapes are fixtures to any
building or reality. The burden of proof is on appellant to
prove that the ·merchandise was permanently attached to
the realrty, and will be treated as chattels rather :than as
fixtures in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
Strong vs. Sunset Oopper Company, Washington, 114 P.
2d 526, 135 ALR 423.
Even assuming the merchandise at issu~ was attached
to· realty, personal property may retain its eharacter as ;such
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where it is agreed ,by parties interested, even though annexed to realty. 42 Am. Jur. 209, Sec. 29.
POINT IV
RUSSELL VS. HARKNESS IS AUTHORITY ON
THE F1ACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

Russell vs. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 Pac. 865, Afd. 118
U. S- H63, is very similar to the instant case. The reports
of the case do not state when possession was taken by the
conditional vendee other than as described as follows on
page 866 of 7 Pac. 865: "that Phelan & Ferguson took
possession of the property in Idaho, where it was at date
of contract, and remained in 1possession until the second
day m December, 1882." This does not disclose whether
possession was taken before, during, or after the date of
the :contract.
The record does not disclose any attempt on the part
of plaintiffs to determine whether or not Mrs. Miller had
a valid title or not to the merchandise she proposed to sell;
nor did they obtain any evidence of title from her.
. On page 868 of 7 Bac. 865, "every person competent
to contract is presumed to know that possession alone is
not sufficient to ~convey good title as against the owner,
and if the purchaser relies upon it without inquiry, he does
it at his peril." It is the duty of a purchaser to inquire and
see that the vendor has good title to his property which he
undertakes to sell.
The plainrtiffs certainly could have protected themselves by a simple inquiry as to where the merchandise was
purchased, and if it was paid for. They could have withheld payment until this was determined.
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In-Russell vs. Harkness, the Utah Supreme Court quotes
wirth approval from Coggill vs. H~ord & N. H. R. Co., 3
Gray 545, Mass, as follmvs:
"The vendee in such cases having no right to the
property, can pass none to others. He has only a bare
right of possession., and those who claim under him,
either as creditors or purchasers, can acquire no higher
or better title. Such is the necessary rule of carrying
into effect the intention of the parties to a conditional
sale and delivery. There is no good reason or equity
in placing the burden of a fraudulent sale by a vendee·,
in violaltion of the condition on which he received the
property, upon a bona fide vendor, ~arther than upon
a bona fide purchaser. On the contrary, if either is
to lose by his fraudulent act, it should be fue latter,
who has dealt with a party having no authority, instead of the former, who relies upon a valid subsisting
contract as the fonndation of his claim. It is the duty
of the purchaser to inquire and see that his vendor has
a good title ·to the property which he undertakes to
sell:"

While it is true that in Russell vs. Harkness the purchaser from the conditional vendee, ast the time of the purchase, knew that the merchandise was not paid for and
knew tJhaJt the conditional vendor claimed title thereto, the
Utah Suprem Court clearly states that a purchaser cannot
rely upon mere possession alone in a conditional vendee
and purchase the merchandise without fulfilling his duty
of inquiry to determine whether or not the conditional vendeh as good title or not before he advances money on the
purchase. It is the purchaser who does not perform his
duty· of inquiry who should suffer any loss ra!ther than the·
conditional vendor who relies upon ·his valid contract.
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CONCLUSION

The evidence is abundant to support lower court.
The original~conrtracting parties· did not intend title to
pass to vendee nntil merchandise was paid f,or. Title remained and does still remain in defendant. This was a conditional sale of personal property as intended by both parties to the ~oonwact. Plaintiffs received no title or even any
evidence off title from conditional vendee.
The judgment of the trial court should be affumed,
with costs to defendant and respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS S. TAYLOR,
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
55 East Center Street

Provo, Utah
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